DTIC ADA268979: Defense Strategy for the 1990s: The Regional Defense Strategy

AD-A268 979

Defense Strategy for the 1990s:
The Regional Defense Strategy

Secretary of Defense Q
Dick Cheney lO

Dick Cheney
January 1993

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Defense Strategy for the 1990s:
The Regional Defense Strategy

TABLE OF CONTENTS

INTRODUCTION.1

I. DEFENSE POLICY GOALS .3

n. THE REGIONAL DEFENSE STRATEGY.5

Regional Focus

Underlying Strategic Concepts
Planning for Uncertainty

Shaping the Future Security Environment
Strategic Depth
Continued U.S. Leadership

Enduring Requirements
Alliances

High-Quality Personnel
Technological Superiority

Elements of the Regional Defense Strategy
Strategic Deterrence and Defense
Forward Presence
Crisis Response
Reconstitution

Translating Elements into Forces & Programs

ffl. REGIONAL GOALS AND CHALLENGES.19

Europe

East Asia/Pacific

The Middle East/Persian Gulf and South Asia
Latin America and the Caribbean
Sub-Saharan Africa

CONCLUSION

27

INTRODUCTION

The past four years have seen extraordinary changes abroad as the Cold
War drew to a close. We have entered a new strategic era. The collapse of the
Soviet Union - the disintegration of the internal as well as the external empire, and
die discrediting of Communism as an ideology with global pretensions and
influence - fundamentally altered, but did not eliminate, the challenges ahead. The
integration of the leading democracies into a U.S.-led system of collective security,
and the prospects of expanding that system, significantly enhance our international
position and provide a crucial legacy for future peace. Our national strategy has
shifted from a focus on a global threat to one on regional challenges and
opportunities. We have moved from Containment to the new Regional Defense
Strategy.

The changes made over the past four years have set the nation on a solid
path to secure and extend the opportunities and hopes of this new era. America and
its allies now have an unprecedented opportunity to preserve with greater ease a
security environment within which our democratic ideals can prosper. Where once
a European-wide war, potentially leading to nuclear exchange, was perhaps only a
few weeks and miles away, today such a threat has fallen back and would take
years to rekindle. With the end of the Cold War, there are no global threats and no
significant hostile alliances. We have a marked lead in critical areas of warfare.

Our alliances, built during our struggle of Containment, are one of the great sources
of our strength in this new era. They represent a democratic “zone of peace,” a
community of democratic nations bound together by a web of political, economic,
and security ties. This zone of peace offers a framework for security not through
competitive rivalries in arms, but through cooperative approaches and collective
security institutions. The combination of these trends has given our nation and our
alliances great depth for our strategic position.

Simply put, it is the intent of the new Regional Defense Strategy to enable
the U.S. to lead in shaping an uncertain future so as to preserve and enhance this
strategic depth won at such great pains. This will require us to strengthen our
alliances and to extend the zone of peace to include the newly independent nations
of Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union, as these now-fragile states succeed
in their struggle to build free societies and free markets out of the ruin of
Communism. Together with our allies, we must preclude hostile nondemocratic
powers from dominating regions critical to our interests and otherwise work to
build an international environment conducive to our values. Yet, even as we hope
to increasingly rely on collective approaches to solve international problems, we
recognize that a collective effort will not always be timely and, in the absence of
U.S. leadership, may not gel. Where the stakes so merit, we must have forces
ready to protect our critical interests.

Our fundamental strategic position and choices as a nation are thus very
different from those we have faced in the past. The choices ahead of us will reset
the nation's direction for the next century. We have today a compelling opportunity
to meet our defense needs at lower cost But as we do so, we must be guided by a
strategy that recognizes that our domestic life cannot flourish if we are beset by
foreign crises. We must not squander the position of security we achieved at great

sacrifice through the Cold War, nor eliminate our ability to shape an uncertain
future security environment in ways favorable to us and those who share our
values.

2

Guided by the new strategy, we are restructuring our forces to meet the
essential demands of strategic deterrence and defense, forward presence, crisis
response, and reconstitution. As we do so, we are reducing our forces significantly
— by more than a million military and civilian personnel. These reductions will
reduce force structure to its lowest level in terms of manpower since before the
Korean War and spending to the lowest percentage of GNP since before the attack
on Pearl Harbor. Yet even as we reduce our forces in size overall, we must not
carelessly destroy their quality or their technological superiority. Along with
alliances, high-quality personnel and technological superiority represent capabilities
that would take decades to restore if foolishly lost in this time of reductions.

Even in this time of downsizing, we must retain capable military fences.

For the world remains unpredictable and well-armed; causes fen conflict persist,
and we have not eliminated age-old temptations for nondemocratic powers to turn to
force or intimidation to achieve their ends. We have sought through the Regional
Defense Strategy to anticipate challenges and opportunities yet to come, to shape a
future of continued progress, and to preclude reversals or the emergence of new
threats. This document discusses the new strategy in some depth and is intended as
a contribution to a national dialogue that very much needs to continue as we look to
protecting the nation’s interests in the 1990s, and beyond.

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I. DEFENSE POLICY GOALS

The national security interests of the United States are enduring: the survival
of the United States as a free and independent nation, with its fundamental values
intact and its institutions and people secure; a healthy and growing U.S. economy
to ensure opportunity for individual prosperity and resources for national endeavors
at home and abroad; healthy, cooperative and politically vigorous relations with
allies and friendly nations; and a stable and secure world, where political and
economic freedom, human rights and democratic institutions flourish.

These national security interests can be translated into four mutually
supportive strategic goals that guide our overall defense efforts:

• Our most fundamental goal is to deter or defeat attack from whatever
source, against the United States, its citizens and forces, and to honor our
historic and treaty commitments.

• The second goal is to strengthen and extend the system of defense
arrangements that binds democratic and like-minded nations together in
common defense against aggression, builds habits of cooperation, avoids
the renationalization of security policies, and provides security at lower
costs and with lower risks for all. Our preference for a collective response
to preclude threats or, if necessary, to deal with them is a key feature of our
Regional Defense Strategy.

• The third goal is to preclude any hostile power from dominating a region
critical to our interests, and also thereby to strengthen the barriers against
the reemergence of a global threat to the interests of the United States and
our allies. These regions include Europe, East Asia, the Middle
East/Persian Gulf, and Latin America. Consolidated, nondemocratic control
of the resources of such a critical region could generate a significant threat to
our security.

• The fourth goal is to help preclude conflict by reducing sources of regional
instability and to limit violence should conflict occur. Within the broader
national security policy of encouraging the spread and consolidation of
democratic government and open economic systems, the Defense
Department furthers these ends through efforts to counter terrorism, drug
trafficking, and other threats to internal democratic order, assistance to
peacekeeping efforts; the provision of humanitarian and security assistance;
limits on the spread of militarily significant technology, particularly the
proliferation of weapons of mass destruction along with the means to
deliver them; and the use of defense-to-defense contacts to assist in
strengthening civil-military institutions and encourage reductions in the
economic burden of military spending.

To reach these goals, the United States must show the leadership necessary
to encomage sustained cooperation among major democratic powers. The
alternative would be to leave our critical interests and the security of our friends
dependent upon individual efforts that could be duplicative, competitive, or
ineffective. We also must encourage and assist Russia, Ukraine, and the other new

states of the former Soviet Union in establishing democratic political systems and
fixe markets so they too can join the democratic “zone of peace.”

But while we favor collective action to respond to threats and challenges in
this new era, a collective response will not always be timely and, in the absence of
U.S. leadership, may not gel. While the United States cannot become the world’s
policeman and assume responsibility for solving every international security
problem, neither can we allow our critical interests to depend solely on international
mechanisms that can be blocked by countries whose interests may be very different
from our own. Where our allies' interests are directly affected, we must expect
diem to take an appropriate share of the responsibility, and in some cases play die
leading role; but we must maintain the capabilities for addressing selectively those
security problems that threaten our own interests. Such capabilities are essential to
our ability to lead, and should international support prove sluggish or inadequate, to
act independendy, as necessary, to protect our critical interests. History suggests
that effective multilateral action is most likely to come about in response to U.S.
leadership, not as an alternative to it

We cannot lead if we fail to maintain the high quality of our forces as we
reduce and restructure them. As a nation we have never before succeeded in pacing
reductions without endangering our interests. We must proceed expeditiously, but
at a pace that avoids breaking die force or sending misleading signals about our
intentions to friends or potential aggressors. An effective ability to reconstitute our
forces is important as well, since it signals that no potential rival could quickly or
easily gain a predominant military position.

At the end of World War I, and again to a lesser extent at the end of World
War II, the United States as a nation made the mistake of believing that we had
achieved a kind of permanent security, that a transformation of the security order
achieved in substantial part through American sacrifice and leadership could be
sustained without our leadership and significant American forces. Today, a great
challenge has passed; but other threats endure, and new ones will arise. If we
reduce our forces carefully, we will be left with a force capable of implementing the
new defense strategy. We will have given ourselves the means to lead common
efforts to meet future challenges and to shape the future environment in ways that
will give us greater security at lower cost

n. THE REGIONAL DEFENSE STRATEGY

Regional Focus

The demise of the global threat posed by Soviet Communism leaves
America and its allies with an unprecedented opportunity to preserve with greater
ease a security environment within which our democratic ideals can prosper. We
have shifted our defense planning from a focus on the global threat posed by the
Soviet Union to a focus on the regional threats and challenges we are more likely to
face in the future. At the same time, we can work to shape the future environment
in ways that would help preclude hostile nondemocratic powers from dominating
regions critical to us. This same approach will also help to preclude the emergence
of a hostile power that could present a global security threat comparable to the one
the Soviet Union presented in the past Precluding regional threats and challenges
can strengthen the underpinnings of a peaceful democratic order in which nations
are able to pursue their legitimate interests without fear of military domination.

In this mare secure international environment there will be enhanced
opportunities for political, economic, environmental, social, and security issues to
be resolved through new or revitalized international organizations, including the
United Nations, or regional arrangements. But the world remains unpredictable
and well-armed, causes for conflict persist, and we have not eliminated age-old
temptations for nondemocratic powers to turn to force or intimidation to achieve
their ends. We must not stand back and allow a new global threat to emerge or
leave a vacuum in a region critical to our interests. Such a vacuum could make
countries there feel vulnerable, which in turn could lead to excessive military
capabilities and an unsteady balance of one against another. If we do stand back it
will be much harder to achieve the enhanced international cooperation for which we
hope.

Underlying Strategic Concepts

The Department of Defense does not decide when our nation will commit
force. However, decisions today about the size and characteristics of the forces we
are building for tomorrow can influence whether threats to our interests emerge
and, if they do emerge, whether we are able to defeat them decisively. Four
concepts illustrate tins relationship.

Planning for Uncertainty . An unavoidable challenge for defense
planners is that we must start development today of forces to counter threats still so
distant into the future that they cannot be confidently predicted. Events of the last
few years demonstrate concretely how quickly and unexpectedly political trends can
feverse themselves. Our ability to predict political alignments and military
capabilities weakens as we look farther into the future.

Yet decisions about military forces cannot be based on a short-term planning
horizon. The military capabilities that we have today and the ones we will have for
the next few years are largely the product of decisions made a decade or more ago.
Much of the capability that we are eliminating now cannot be restored quickly, and
precipitous cuts would do long-lasting damage, even to the capabilities that we
retain.

Thus, we must reduce and reshape our forces not only to respond to the
near-term threats that we can measure clearly today, or even to the trends most
likely to continue. We also must hedge against the emergence of unexpected
threats, the reversal of favorable trends, or even fundamental changes in the nature
of our challenges. Risk can never be entirely eliminated. The limits on our ability
to predict the future must be recognized, and flexibility to reduce the consequences
of being wrong must be built into even our current forces and programs.

We are building defense forces today for a future that is particularly
uncertain, given the magnitude of recent changes in the security environment.
Fundamentally, we are striving to provide a future President with the capabilities
five, ten or fifteen years from now to counter threats or pursue interests that cannot
be defined with precision today. While we can safely reduce force structure and the
pace of modernization, we must retain the ability to protect our interests and, by so
doing, to help deter unwanted reversals.

Shaping the Future Security Environment. America cannot base its
future security on a shaky record of prediction or even on a prudent recognition of
uncertainty. Sound defense planning seeks as well to help shape the future. Our
strategy is designed to preclude threats and to encourage trends that advance U.S.
security objectives in the future. This is not simply within our means; it is critical to
our future security.

The containment strategy we pursued for the past forty years successfully
shaped the world we see today. By our refusal to be intimidated by Soviet military
power, we and our allies molded a world in which Communism was forced to
confront its contradictions. Even as we and our allies carried the defense burden
required in the Cold War, democracy was able to develop and flourish.

One of the primary tasks we face today in shaping the future is carrying
long standing alliances into die new era, and turning old enmities into new
cooperative relationships. If we and other leading democracies continue to build a
democratic security community, a much safer world is likely to emerge. If we act
separately, many other problems could result If we can assist former Warsaw Pact
countries, including the newly independent states of the former Soviet Union,
particularly Russia and Ukraine, in choosing a steady course of democratic
progress and reduced military forces subject to responsible, civilian democratic
control, we will have successfully secured the fruits of forty years of effort Our
goal should be to bring a democratic Russia and the other new democracies into the
defense community of democratic nations so that they can become a force for peace,
democracy, and freedom not only in Europe but also in other critical regions of the
world.

Cooperative defense arrangements enhance security, while reducing the
defense burden for everyone. In die absence of effective defense cooperation,
regional rivalries could lead to tensions or even hostilities that would threaten to
bring critical regions under hostile domination. It is not in our interest or those of
die other democracies to return to earlier periods in which multiple military powers
balanced one against another in what passed for security structures, while regional,
or even global peace hung in the balance. As in the past, such struggles might
eventually force the United States at much higher cost to protect its interests and
counter the potential development of a new global threat.

7

Maintaining highly capable forces also is critical to sustaining the U.S.
leadership with which we can shape the future. Such leadership supports collective
defense arrangements and precludes hostile competitors from challenging our
critical interests. Our fundamental belief in democracy and human rights gives
other nations confidence that our significant military power threatens no one's
aspirations for peaceful democratic progress.

Our forces also can shape the future environment by performing the "non-
tradidonal" roles of humanitarian or peacekeeping operations. Generally such
situations are of international concern, and we would expect to be part of a
commensurate multinational effort; however, U.S. leadership may be crucial to
catalyze such action, and we may have unique capabilities that would appropriately
complement others' forces.

Our ability to shape the future rests not only on our efforts to keep closed
the door to aggression and military intimidation; it rests also on our ability to
provide the example necessary for others to take positive, reciprocal steps. The
President’s nuclear initiatives of the fall and winter of 1991-92 induced the former
Soviet Union to take positive reciprocating steps that will help reduce the remaining
threat posed by nuclear forces on the territory of the former Soviet Union. These
initiatives made possible the U.S.-Russian agreements of June 1992 and
subsequent signing of the START II treaty in January 1993. Similarly, NATO’s
new strategy not only reflects an adjustment to the reduced threat environment in
Europe but equally it reassures our former adversaries of the truly defensive nature
of the NATO alliance. Through s uch i nitiatives we can solidify the gains achieved
through START, START II and CEE and go beyond them.

Our ability to reduce sources of regional instability and to limit violence
should conflict occur also is critical to shaping the environment. This includes, for
example, updating our strategy to counter die proliferation of militarily significant
technology, particularly the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction along with
die means to deliver them. Our traditional export control efforts must not only be
updated and strengthened in this new era, but supplemented by political dissuasion,
bilateral and multilateral negotiations, and inspection and destruction missions, as
illustrated in the case of Iraq.

Strategic Depth. America's strategic position is stronger than it has been
for decades. Today, there is no challenger to peaceful democratic order similar to
that posed by the Soviet Union and die Warsaw Pact There are no significant
hostile alliances. To the contrary, the strongest and most capable countries in the
world remain our friends. The threat of global, even nuclear war, once posed by
massive Warsaw Pact forces poised at the inter-German border, first receded
hundreds of miles east and has since been transformed into the promise of a new
era of strategic cooperation.

Not only has our position improved markedly with respect to the passing of
a global challenge, but our strategic position has improved in regional contexts as
well. For the near-term, we and our allies possess sufficient capabilities to counter
threats in critical regions. Soviet Communism no longer exacerbates local conflicts,
and we need no longer be concerned that an otherwise remote problem could affect
the balance of power between us and a hostile global challenger. We have won
great depth for our strategic position.

8

In this regard, it is important to reflect in our strategy the fact that the
international system is no longer characterized by Cold War bipolarity. The Cold
War required the United States and its allies to be prepared to contain the spread of
Soviet power on a global basis. Developments in even remote areas could affect the
United States’ relative position in the world, and therefore often required a U.S.
response. The United States remains a nation with global interests, but we must
reexamine in light of the new defense strategy whether and to what extent particular
challenges engage our interests. These changes and the growing strength of our
friends and allies will allow us to be more selective in determining the extent to
which U.S. forces must be committed to safeguard shared interests.

The first major conflict of the post-Cold War era preserved our strategic
position in one of die regions of the world critical to our interests. Our success in
organizing an international coalition in the Persian Gulf against Saddam Hussein
kept a critical region from the control of a ruthless dictator bent on developing
nuclear, biological and chemical weapons and harming Western interests. Instead
of a mare radical Middle East/Persian Gulf region under Saddam's influence,
Saddam struggles to retain control in Iraq, Iraq’s dangerous military has been
greatly damaged, our ties with moderate states are stronger, energy resources are
secure, and significant progress has been made in the Arab-Israeli peace process.

Our strategy is designed to preserve this position by keeping our alliances
strong and our threats small. Our tools include political and economic measures
and others such as peacekeeping operations, security assistance, defense-to-defense
contacts, humanitarian aid and intelligence assistance, as well as security measures
to prevent the emergence of a nondemocratic aggressor in critical regions. We
bring to this task our considerable moral influence as the world's leading
democracy. We can provide mare security at a reduced cost If a hostile power
sought to present a regional challenge again, or if a new, antagonistic global threat
or alliance emerged in the future, we would have die ability to counter it. But the
investments required to maintain the strategic depth that we won through forty years
of the Cold War are much smaller than those it took to secure this strategic depth or
those that would be required if we lost it

Continued U.S. Leadership . U.S. leadership, essential for the
successful resolution of the Cold War, remains critical to achieving our long-term
goals in this new era. The United States continues to prefer to address hostile,
nondemocratic threats to our interests wherever possible through collective security
efforts that take advantage of the strength of our allies and friends. However,
sustained U.S. leadership will be essential for maintaining those alliances and for
otherwise protecting our interests.

Recognition that the United States is capable of opposing regional
aggression mil be an important factor in inducing nations to work together to
stabilize crises and resist or defeat aggression. For most countries, a general
interest in international stability and security will not be enough to induce them to
put themselves at risk simply in the hope that others will join them. Only a nation
that is strong enough to act decisively can provide the leadership needed to
encourage others to resist aggression. Collective security failed in the 1930s
because no strong power was willing to provide the leadership behind which less
powerful countries could rally against Fascism. It worked in the Gulf because the

United States was willing and able to provide that leadership. Thus, even when a
broad potential coalition exists, leadership will be necessary to realize it

The perceived capability -- which depends upon the actual ability -- of the
United States to act independently, if necessary, is thus an important factor even in
those cases where we do not actually use it It will not always be incumbent upon
us to assume a leadership role. In some cases, we will promote the assumption of
leadership by others, such as the United Nations or regional organizations. In the
end, there is no contradiction between U.S. leadership and multilateral action;
history shows precisely that U.S. leadership is the necessary prerequisite for
effective international action. We will, therefore, not ignore the need to be prepared
to protea our critical interests and honor our commitments with only limited
additional help, or even alone, if necessary. A future President will need options
allowing him to lead and, where the international reaction proves sluggish or
inadequate, to act independently to protect our critical interests.

As a nation, we have paid dearly in the past for letting our capabilities fall
and our will be questioned. There is a moment in time when a smaller, ready force
can preclude an arms race, a hostile move or a conflict Once lost that moment
cannot be recaptured by many thousands of soldiers poised on the edge of combat.
Our efforts to rearm and to understand our danger before World War II came too
late to spare us and others a global conflagration. Five years after our resounding
global victory in World War H, we were nearly pushed ofi the Korean peninsula by
a third rate power. We erred in the past when we failed to maintain needed forces.
And we paid dearly for our error.

Enduring Refluiremenls

The new defense strategy with its regional focus reflects the need to pay
special attention to three enduring requirements of our national security posture.
Each requires careful, long-term attention, the investment of defense resources, and
supportive operating practices; each represents key strengths that cannot be readily
restored should they be lost

Alliances . Our alliance structure is perhaps our nation’s most significant
achievement since the Second World War. It represents a “silent victory” of
building long-standing alliances and friendships with nations that constitute a
prosperous, largely democratic, market-oriented zone of peace and prosperity that
encompasses more than two-thirds of the world’s economy. Defense cooperation
among die democracies has not only deterred external threats, it has provided an
environment in which we and our allies have peacefully developed and prospered.
The United States will maintain and nurture its friendships and alliances in Europe,
East Asia/Pacific, the Middle East/Persian Gulf, Latin America and elsewhere.

The growing strength of our friends and allies will make it possible for them
to assume greater responsibilities for our mutual security interests. We will work
with them towards this end, including reductions in U.S. military forces stationed
overseas, particularly as our friends and allies are able to assume greater
responsibilities. There will remain, however, a significant role for U.S. forward
presence, including stationed forces, and changes must be managed carefully to
ensure that reductions are not mistakenly perceived as a withdrawal of U.S.
commitment In addition, certain situations like the crisis leading to the Gulf War

are likely to engender ad hoc coalitions. We should plan to maximize the value of
such coalitions. This may include specialized roles for our forces as well as
developing cooperative practices with others. Specific issues concerning alliances
and coalitions are treated in detail in Part m, “Regional Goals and Challenges.”

High-Oualitv Personnel. Our victory in the Gulf War demonstrated
impressively the importance of high-quality personnel and effective leaders. The
highly trained, highly motivated all-volunteer total force we have worked so hard to
build is the key to maintaining our future military leadership and capabilities. We
also require high-quality career civilians, especially in the managerial, scientific and
technical fields. Our challenge for the future is to preserve the high-quality active,
reserve, and civilian force we have worked so hard to build.

The Gulf War tested the training, discipline, and morale of our military
forces and they performed superbly. To continue to attract the highest quality
people, we must provide challenging and realistic training supplemented by
advanced training techniques such as interactive simulation. We also must provide
tire quality of life they and their families deserve, including keeping the amount of
time military units are deployed away from home at reasonable levels.

High-quality personnel require outstanding military leadership. Our success
in the Gulf reflected such leadership. We must continue to train our military leaders
in joint operations and in cooperative efforts with the forces of many different
nations. They also must be given the opportunity and encouragement to pursue
innovative doctrine for operations and new approaches to problems.

Identifying the core military competencies that will be most important in the
future will be among the highest priorities of our military leadership. New
equipment is not sufficient. Innovation in its use also is necessary. Our
understanding of warfare and the way we intend to defend our interests as a nation
must continually develop and evolve in the ongoing military-technological
revolution. Future challenges will require the continued mastery of critical areas of
warfare, but we also require mastery of evolving capabilities, perhaps replacing
some ihat are critical today. An essential task will be to begin preparing for
tomorrow's challenges while making hard decisions about capabilities we need no
longer emphasize.

Technological Superiority . The onset of a new military-technological
revolution presents continued challenges not only in the realm of technological
superiority but also in the way we organize, train, and employ our military forces.
Tire Gulf War made clear the early promise of this revolution, emphasizing the
importance of recent breakthroughs in low-observable, information gathering and
processing, precision strike, and other key technologies. Our investment in
ihnovation must be sustained at levels necessary to assure that U.S.-fielded forces
dominate the military-technological revolution.

We must maintain superiority in key areas of technology. It is critical,
therefore, that we identify the highest leverage technologies and pursue those with
vigor. U.S. forces must retain a decisive lead in those technologies critical on
future battlefields. To provide such high quality forces for tomorrow, we must, in
the first instance, maintain a robust science and technology program, balanced
between a core of broad sustaining programs and selected ‘"thrusts” that contribute

directly to high priority needs. This must be complemented by technology
safeguards and export control regimes targeted, in coordination with our friends
and allies, on particular proliferation concerns.

Robust science and technology alone will not maintain our qualitative
advantage. New technologies must be incorporated into weapons systems that are
provided in numbers sufficient for doctrine and tactics to be developed. To do this
without large-scale production will require innovations in training technologies and
the technology testing process. Through simulation, we can investigate before we
buy new weapons or systems how well they may perform on the battlefield. In
addition, we must encourage new manufacturing processes, facilities, and
equipment This will be increasingly important over time.

All of this, however, does not mean we will move rapidly into large-scale
production of numerous new weapons systems. We will be procuring less because
our armed forces will be smaller, and because the need for modernization is reduced
with the demise of the Soviet Union. During the Cold War, time and production
pressures created by Soviet weapons developments resulted in a defense acquisition
process geared to early production of new systems, often without as thorough a
prior development as desired. Science and technology can be a much more
important factor in the overall acquisition process - doing more than before to
“prove out” new technology and components before programs enter the formal
acquisition process. These concepts provide the basis for a new acquisition
approach. Nevertheless, development of new technologies and their incorporation
into weapons systems through a more efficient acquisition process will be essential
'o provide the advantages smaller forces will need to deter or prevail in future
conflicts.

Elements of the Regional Defense Strategy

The Regional Defense Strategy seeks to protect American interests and to
shape a more stable and democratic world. It does so by adopting a regional focus
for our efforts to strengthen cooperative defense arrangements with friendly states
and to preclude hostile, nondemocratic powers from dominating regions of the
world critical to us. In this way also the strategy aims to raise a further barrier to
the rise of any serious global challenge. To accomplish these goals, we must
preserve U.S. leadership, maintain leading-edge military capabilities, and enhance
collective security among democratic nations.

The Regional Defense Strategy rests on four essential elements:

• Strategic Deterrence and Defense - a credible strategic nuclear deterrent
capability, and strategic defenses against limited strikes.

• Forward Presence -- forward deployed or stationed forces (albeit at reduced
levels) to strengthen alliances, show our resolve, and dissuade challengers
in regions critical to us.

• Crisis Response - forces and mobility to respond quickly and decisively
with a range of options to regional crises of concern to us.

• Reconstitution - the capability to create additional new forces to hedge
against any renewed global threat.

12

Strategic Deterrence and Defense . Even though the risk of a massive
strategic nuclear attack has decreased significantly with the rise of democratic forces
and the collapse of the former Soviet Union, deterring nuclear attack must remain
the highest defense priority of the nation. It is the one area where our survival could
be at risk in a matter of moments. U.S. nuclear targeting policy and plans have
changed, and should continue to change, to account for die welcome developments
in states of Eastern Europe and the farmer Soviet Union. Nonetheless, survivable
and flexible U.S. strategic nuclear forces still are essential to deter use of the
modem nuclear forces that will exist in the former Soviet Union even after START
and START II reductions have been implemented. Our strategic nuclear forces also
provide an important deterrent hedge against the possibility of an unforeseen global
threat emerging.

Fundamental changes in Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union have
eliminated the threat of massive Soviet aggression launched fiom the former East
Germany that required heavy reliance on the threat of nuclear weapons for
deterrence. This permits us to move into a new era in nuclear farces. This was
evidenced in the President’s nuclear initiatives in 1991 and 1992, which made
major changes in our tactical nuclear posture and strategic nuclear deterrent forces
designed to enhance stability while eliminating weapons, to further reduce the
possibility of accident or miscalculation, and to encourage corresponding reductions
in the nuclear posture of the former Soviet Union.

The leaders of Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Ukraine have stated their readiness
to eliminate strategic offensive forces, while Russia is significantly reducing its
force levels. (These four new states of the former Soviet Union are the only ones
with strategic nuclear weapons on their territory. Russian authorities assure us that
all tactical weapons are now on Russian territory.) They recognize the United
States is not a threat and rightly view strategic forces as diverting scarce resources
from rebuilding their troubled economies and complicating die improvement of
relations with the West. We have been working with these leaders to provide
financial and technical assistance to reduce and dismantle these nuclear forces. We
already have some programs underway to assist with the safe and secure
transportation, storage, and destruction of weapons and the prevention of their
proliferation. We should actively seek additional ways to further these ends.

Both the U.S. and Russia have now agreed in START II to even more
dramatic changes to their nuclear deterrent forces that will significantly enhance
stability. For us these include, in addition to reductions to START levels, fewer
intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs), with the remaining ICBMs having only
one warhead apiece; and fewer warheads on our ballistic missile submarines. In
addition, a substantial number of bombers will be oriented primarily toward
conventional missions. In die end, die actual number of warheads will be roughly
half of what we planned to have under START.

As we reduce the size of our offensive nuclear forces, we must ensure the
survivability -- and therefore the essential stability - of our strategic deterrent This
will limit reductions in tire overall number of strategic platforms. Our planning also
should take account of the greatly reduced likelihood of a deliberate massive attack
in die present international situation and consider the danger of an accidental or
unauthorized attack.

A successful transformation of Russia, Ukraine and other states of the
former Soviet Union to stable democracies should clearly be one of our major
goals. But we are not there yet. Our pursuit of this goal must recognize the as yet
robust strategic nuclear force facing us, the fragility of democracy in the new states
of the former Soviet Union, and the possibility that these new states might revert to
closed, authoritarian, and hostile regimes. Our movement toward this goal must,
therefore, leave us with timely and realistic responses to unanticipated reversals in
our relations and a survivable deterrent capability.

Strategic forces also will continue to support our global role and
international commitments, including our trans-Atlantic links to NATO. Collective
defense allows countries to rely on the contributions of others in protecting their
mutual interests in ways that lessen the risks and the costs for all. The nuclear
umbrella that the United States has extended over our allies has helped deter attack
successfully for four decades. This has been a risk-reducing and cost-saving
measure for us all; it is one we can afford fiscally to continue and one that our
interests cannot afford to let lapse.

Nuclear weapons cannot be disinvented; and the threat of nuclear
proliferation, despite our best efforts, persists. Other countries - some of them,
like Iraq, especially hostile and irresponsible - threaten to acquire nuclear weapons.
Some countries are also pursuing other highly-destructive systems, such as
chemical and biological weapons. These developments require us to be able to
deter use of such weapons, and to improve our defense capabilities.

The threats posed by instability in nuclear weapons states and by the global
proliferation of ballistic missiles have grown considerably. The threat of an
accidental or unauthorized missile launch may increase significantly through this
decade. The new technology embodied in the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI)
program has made ballistic missile defense capability a realistic, achievable, and
affordable concept We need to deploy missile defenses not wily to protect
ourselves and our forward deployed farces, but also to have the ability to extend
protection to others. Like extended deterrence provided by our nuclear farces,
defenses can contribute to a regime of extended protection for friends and allies and
further strengthen a democratic security community. This is why, with the support
of Congress, as reflected in the Missile Defense Act, we have sought to move
toward the day when defenses will protect the community of nations embracing
democratic values from international outlaws armed with ballistic missiles who may
not be deterred by offensive forces alone. It is this vision that is reflected in our
commitment to developing a Global Protection System (GPS) not only with
traditional friends and allies but also with the emerging democracies of Eastern
Europe and the former Soviet Union.

Deployment of defenses against limited strikes also should continue to be an
integral element of our efforts to curtail ballistic missile proliferation. Defenses
undermine the military utility of such systems and should serve to dampen the
incentive to acquire ballistic missiles. (Further discussion of weapons of mass
destruction issues is found in the Crisis Response section.)

The strategic command, control and communications system should
continue to evolve toward a joint global structure, ensuring that its capabilities and
survivability remain appropriate to the evolving threat and the smaller forces it will
support We also should take advantage of the potential of our strategic C3I
investments to support conventional crisis response.

14

In the decade ahead, we must adopt the right combination of deterrent
forces, tactical and strategic, while creating the proper balance between offense and
active defense to mitigate risk from weapons of mass destruction and their means of
delivery, whatever the source. For now this requires retaining ready forces for a
survivable nuclear deterrent, including tactical forces. In addition, we must
complete needed force modernization and upgrades. These deterrent forces need to
be complemented with early introduction of ballistic missile defenses against limited
strikes.

Forward Presence . Our forward presence helps to shape the evolving
security environment. We will continue to rely on forward presence of U.S. forces
to show U.S. commitment and lend credibility to our alliances, to deter aggression,
enhance regional stability, promote U.S. influence and access, and, when
necessary, provide an initial crisis response capability. Forward presence is vital to
the maintenance of the system of collective defense by which the United States has
been able to work with our friends and allies to protect our security interests, while
minimizing the burden of defense spending and of unnecessary arms competition.
The roles that forward presence plays in specific regions under the Regional
Defense Strategy are treated in detail in Part m, “Regional Goals and Challenges.”

While we are prudently reducing the levels of our presence very
substantially, it is increasingly important to emphasize our intent to retain adequate
presence. We should plan to continue a wide range of forward presence activities,
including not only overseas basing of forces, but prepositioning and periodic
deployments, exercises, exchanges or visits of forces. Forward basing of forces
and the prepositioning of equipment facilitate rapid reinforcement and enhance the
capability to project forces into critical regions.

Forward bases and access agreements must become more flexible as the
security environment evolves. But they must remain oriented toward providing
visible, though unobtrusive, presence and a forward staging area for responding to
crises large and small Forward bases are critical to successfully implementing our
strategy at reduced farce levels.

In regions of the world where we lack a land-based presence, maritime
forces (including afloat prepositioned equipment), long-range aviation, and other
contingency forces allow us to exert presence and underscore our commitment to
friends and allies, and, when necessary, aid our response to crises. Exercises,
occasional deployments, prepositioning, defense exchanges and visits build trust,
cooperation and common operating procedures between militaries. Important, too,
are host nation arrangements to provide the infrastructure and logistical support to
allow for the forward deployment or projection of forces when necessary.

Our forward forces should increasingly be prepared to fulfill multiple
regional roles, and in some cases extra-regional roles, rather than being prepared
only for operations in the locale where they are based. Moreover, as in the Gulf
War, our forward presence forces must be ready to provide support for military
operations in other theaters. In addition, through forward presence, we can
prosecute the war on drugs; provide humanitarian and security assistance and
support for peacekeeping operations; evacuate U.S. citizens in danger abroad; and
advance defense-to-defense contacts to strengthen democratic reforms.

Forward presence is a crucial element of the new regional strategy, and a
major factor in overall conventional (including special operations) force size.
Generally forces for forward presence (including associated CONUS-based forces
for rotation) must be predominantly in the active components. As we reduce force
structure to base force levels, each military department must seek innovative ways
to continue providing the crucial benefits of forward presence - both political and
operational ~ with acceptable impact on the smaller force. This calls for exploring
new ways of operating forces in peacetime. Areas to consider include increasing
the use of periodic visits of forces, possibly both active and reserve, for training or
exercises; innovative manning or maintenance practices; additional overseas
homeporting; combined planning; and security and humanitarian assistance.

Precipitous reductions in forward presence may unsettle security relations.
Where forward bases are involved, due attention must be paid to minimizing the
impact of dislocations on military families. Planned reductions should be
undertaken deliberately, with careful attention to making in-course adjustments as
necessary.

Crisis Response. The ability to respond to regional or local crises is a
key element of the Regional Defense Strategy. The regional and local contingencies
we might face are many and varied, both in size and intensity, potentially involving
a broad range of military farces of varying capabilities and technological
sophistication under an equally broad range of geopolitical circumstances. Highly
ready and rapidly deployable power projection forces, including forcible entry
forces, remain key means of precluding challengers, of protecting our interests
from unexpected or sudden challenges, and of achieving decisive results if the use
of force is necessary.

During the Cold War, Americans understood that national survival was at
stake and that a long, drawn-out and costly war could result. In regional conflicts,
our stake may seem less apparent. We should provide forces with capabilities that
minimize the need to trade American lives with tyrants and aggressors who do not
care about their own people. Thus, our response to regional crises must be
decisive, requiring the high-quality personnel and technological edge to win quickly
and with minimum casualties. A decisive force will not always be a large-scale
force; sometimes a measured military action can contain or preclude a crisis, or
otherwise obviate a much larger, more costly operation. But when we choose to
act, we must be capable of acting quickly and effectively. We must be prepared to
make regional aggressors fight on our terms, matching our strengths against their
weaknesses.

Consequently, crisis response requires maintaining a broad range of
capabilities, particularly emphasizing high readiness forces sufficient to enable
response to short-warning contingencies; sufficient munitions and spares; adequate
intelligence capabilities; enhanced mobility to enable us to deploy sizable forces
long distances on short notice; and a number of specific enhancements growing out
of lessons learned from the Gulf War.

Our strategy further recognizes that when the United States is engaged,
perhaps in concert with others, in a substantial regional crisis or is committed to a
more prolonged operation, potential aggressors in other areas may be tempted to
exploit our preoccupation. Under these circumstances, our forces must remain able

to deter or to respond rapidly to other crises or to expand an initial crisis
deployment in the event of escalation, also on short notice.

The short notice that may characterize many regional crises requires highly
responsive military forces. Required military personnel will be maintained in dial
component of the Total Force - active or reserve -- in which they can most
effectively, including with minimum casualties, and most economically accomplish
required missions. This generally requires forces for forward presence (including
associated CONUS-based forces for rotation) and combat farces and initial support
forces for crisis response to be predominantly in the active components. Reserve
components will fulfill vital contingency roles, primarily including mobility and
selected critical support for initially deploying farces; increasing increments of
support for continuing and expanding deployments; and increasing increments of
combat capability as well, especially for large, protracted and/or concurrent
contingencies.

The crisis response element of the strategy also has important implications
for our inter- and intra-theater mobility posture. Our crisis response forces will be
drawn largely from CONUS, or possibly from forward deployed locations in other
theaters. Our mobility posture must be able to supplement forward presence forces
quickly and provide the bulk of necessary combat power and suppon.

Future regional conflicts will be complicated by increases in both the
conventional and unconventional capabilities of potential adversaries. During the
Gulf War we had to prepare to handle an adversary holding chemical weapons and
biological agents. We remain concerned that a number of potentially hostile nations
are working to develop nuclear or other unconventional weapons. The threat of
regional adversaries introducing nuclear weapons would greatly complicate future
regional crises. As we learned from our experience with Iraq, it can be extremely
difficult to know how far such efforts have progressed. Even relatively old
technology, which in fact will characterize tire vast majority of cases, can represent
a tremendous challenge, as demonstrated by the Iraqi use of ballistic missiles in the
Gulf War.

The global diffusion of conventional military and dual-use technologies will
enable a growing number of countries to field highly capable conventional weapons
systems, such as stealthy cruise missiles, integrated air defenses, submarines,
modem command and control systems, and even space-based assets. Third World
countries attempting to acquire nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons will
undoubtedly attempt to take advantage of economic distress in the former Soviet
Union. We have worked multi laterally to strengthen international regimes intended
to halt the diffusion of these weapons and technologies, and bilaterally to stop
unauthorized leakage.

U.S. forces must be capable of operating against adversaries who possess
weapons of mass destruction. Active defenses (including existing theater missile
defense assets and future assets for global protection against limited strikes),
passive defenses (including detection capabilities, more effective vehicle crew-
compartment protective systems, and vaccines), and specialized intelligence will be
needed. If the use of weapons of mass destruction is threatened, we may need to
win even more quickly ami decisively, and we would still want to retain the
advantages necessary to keep our own losses as low as possible. (Further
discussion of WMD issues is found in the Strategic Deterrence and Defense
section.)

17

The Gulf War provides a host of lessons that should continue to guide
future crisis response planning. The Department should selectively focus
investment on the following high-priority areas: rapidly deployable anti-armor
capabilities; enhanced combat abilities to identify friendly forces and thus reduce
casualties from misdirected friendly fire; improved naval and land mine and
countermine capabilities; defenses against chemical and biological weapons and
agents; defenses against tactical ballistic and cruise missiles; improved capabilities
for pr jcision air strikes; improved integration and flexibility of tactical command,
control, communications and intelligence; and improved national-level intelligence.
More generally, the Department also should apply the relevant lessons of the Gulf
War identified in the Final Report to Congress on the Conduct of the Persian Gulf
War and other subsequent reports. A complete understanding of the war and its
implications for U.S. forces will continue to evolve for some time to come.

Finally, we must be prepared for crises and contingencies stemming from
low-intensity conflict, which includes terrorism, insurgency, and subversion. In
response to these threats to our interests, we must be prepared to undertake smaller-
scade operations that require forces using specialized skills, equipment, or
approaches. Such operations include non-combatant evacuations, peacekeeping
missions, hostage rescues, and counterinsurgency and counterterrorism operations.

Reconstitution. With the demise of the Cold War, we have gained
sufficient strategic depth that potential global-scale threats to our security are now
very distant -- so much so that they are hard to identify or define with precision.

The new strategy, therefore, prudently reduces spending and accepts risk in this
lower probability area of threat in order to refocus reduced defense resources both
on die more likely near-term threats and on high priority investments in the
enduring requirements of our strategy.

The dissolution of the Soviet Union has made it much less likely that a
global conventional challenge to U.S. and Western security will reemerge from the
Eurasian heartland for many years to come - at least for the balance of this decade.
Even if, for example, some future Russian leadership were to adopt strategic aims
threatening a global challenge similar to that presented by the Soviet Union in the
Cold War, current estimates are that such force reconstitution efforts would allow
several years or more of U.SVallied response time, and could only happen after an
authoritarian reversal and systemic realignment itself spanning several years.

Nevertheless, we could still face in the more distant future a new global
threat or some emergent alliance of hostile, nondemocradc regional powers. For
the longer term, then, our reconstitution strategy focuses on supporting our national
security policy to preclude the development of a global threat contrary to the
interests of the United States. Should such a threat begin to emerge, we would use
die available lead time to forestall or counter it at the lowest possible levels of
militarization. Our reconstitution strategy seeks to provide sufficient capability to
create additional new forces and capabilities to deter and defend our interests as
necessary, drawing on “regeneration” assets (cadre-type units and stored
equipment), industrial/technology base assets, and manpower assets.

Reconstitution should use low-cost assets to provide an inexpensive hedge.
As we draw down the force, Cold War investments present opportunities for "smart
lay-away" of long-lead elements of force structure or production capability that

offer a high-leverage reconstitution hedge at quite modest cost, or might become
useful to a friendly nation facing a major threat

Measures planned and used for response to early indications of a specific
reconstitution threat must strike a careful balance between, on the one hand, the
needs to demonstrate resolve, strengthen deterrence, and begin enhancing military
capabilities, and, on the other hand, the imperative to avoid provocative steps and to
maintain the ability to arrest or reverse our steps without creating military
vulnerabilities.

Translating the Elements into Forces and Programs. Our forces
and programs have been designed and sized as a coherent whole to support the
elements of our new regional defense strategy, carefully weighing present and
future challenges. The restructuring needed to support our new strategy also calls
for a shift from program planners’ traditional four “pillars” of military capability
(readiness, sustainability, modernization, and force structure) to six pillars. We
have divided the modernization pillar, distinguishing science and technology from
systems acquisition, to make explicit the higher relative priority of science and
technology in this new era. We have designated infrastructure and overhead as a
new pillar, to explicitly focus on the need for cuts in overhead in this time of major
cuts in fighting capability.

Accordingly, we have adopted these relative priorities among the new six
“pillars” of defense resources:

• Readiness • Force Structure

• Sustainability

• Science and Technology

• Systems Acquisition

• Infrastructure and Overhead

Specifically, it is of utmost importance to maintain fares of high readiness and
adequate size. Of lower but still high priority is the sustainability sufficient for the
intensity and duration of regional conflicts. The new strategy also gives high
priority to selected science and technology to keep our qualitative edge in systems
and in doctrine. By contrast, a profound slowing in former Soviet modernization
that long drove our programs enables greatly reduced emphasis on systems
acquisition, and a fundamentally new approach to overall defense acquisition.
Finally, the Department must vigorously pursue reductions and management
efficiencies in defense infrastructure and overhead, continuing the vigorous pursuit
of savings initiated under the Defense Management Review. This relative priority
among the new “six pillars” aims to reduce our cost of doing business and direct
our shrinkin g resources to ensuring very high quality, ready forces and rigorous
technical and doctrinal innovation.

HI. REGIONAL GOALS AND CHALLENGES

We can take advantage of the Cold War’s end and the dissolution of the
Soviet Union to shift our planning focus to regional threats and challenges. The
future of events in major regions remains uncertain. Regional and local actors may
pursue hostile agendas through direct confrontation or through such indirect means
as subversion and terrorism. The new defense strategy, with its focus on regional
matters, seeks to shape this uncertain future and position us to retain the capabilities
needed to protect our interests. With this focus we should work with our Mends
and allies to preclude the emergence of hostile, nondemocratic threats to our critical
interests and to shape a more secure international environment conducive to our
democratic ideals.

Europe

We confront a Europe in the midst of historic transformation, no longer
starkly divided between the Soviet-dominated Warsaw Pact and the Western
Alliance. We have made great strides toward a Europe "whole and free." We are
striving to aid the efforts in the former Eastern bloc to build free societies. Over the
long term, the most effective guarantee that the former Soviet empire's successor
states do not threaten U.S. and Western interests is successful democratization and
economic reform.

The breakup of the former Soviet Union presents an historic opportunity to
transform the adversarial relationship of the Cold War into a relatio nship
characterized by cooperation as articulated in the Washington Charter signed by
Presidents Bush and Yeltsin in June of 1992. But we must recognize what we arc
so often told by the leaders of the new democracies - that continued U.S. presence
in Europe is an essential part of the West's overall efforts to maintain stability even
in the midst of such dramatic change. History has demonstrated that our own
security is inseparably linked to that of Europe. It is of fundamental importance to
preserve NATO as the primary instrument of Western defense and security, as well
as the channel for U.S. engagement and participation in larger European security
affairs, even as we work increasingly with the other institutions emerging in
Europe.

Our common security and European stability can be enhanced by the further
development of a network of interlocking institutions that, in conjunction with
NATO, constitute the emerging security architecture of Europe. We should work
within the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) and the
North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC) and with the European Community
(EC) and the Western European Union (WEU) to promote security and stability.
Emerging frameworks of regional cooperation also will be important

Even as European institutions grow, we need to strengthen Alliance
cohesion, and to develop new common understandings of how the Alliance can
respond collectively to nxture challenges. Our European friends and allies should
be encouraged to assume a greater share of the burden in maintaining world order
and protecting common interests worldwide. Important security interests are at
stake for both the Europeans and for us in many areas, including notably Eastern
Europe, the Middle East/Persian Gulf, and the Mediterranean, including North
Africa.

20

In June 1992, the North Atlantic Council of NATO agreed to support CSCE
peacekeeping activities on a case-by-case basis. In the former Yugoslavia, NATO
has deployed its Standing Naval Farce Mediterranean to the Adriatic Sea to assist
with UN sanctions, while NATO AW ACS are helping to monitor the no-fly zone
over Bosnia-Herzegovina. NATO defense ministers in December 1992 agreed to
refine NATO’s capability for such peacekeeping operations. They announced that
support for UN and CSCE peacekeeping should be included among the missions of
NATO forces and headquarters and tasked their permanent representatives to
identify specific measures to enhance NATO’s peacekeeping capabilities.

As NATO continues to provide the indispensable foundation for a stable
security environment in Europe, it is of fundamental importance to preserve
NATO's integrated military command structure. While U.S. forces will continue to
be stationed on the continent and contiguous maritime areas, the new threat
environment will enable us to reduce their number, and they may, in part, play
more specialized roles. But our objective should be to preserve a substantial level
of U.S. farces in Western Europe with sufficient organic combat and support
capabilities to maintain the viability of the Alliance; promote peaceful progress in
Europe; permit the timely reinforcement of Europe should there be a reemergence of
a significant threat; and support out-of-area contingencies. The peaceful defense-to-
defense contacts between our forces in Europe and the militaries in Eastern Europe
and the farmer Soviet Union also can be a force for peace.

To retain meaningful operational capabilities, our objective for U.S. ground
forces in Western Europe should be a capable corps. We can also reduce our
tactical fighter wing presence by half or mare. We have eliminated ground-based
nuclear forces in Europe and withdrawn U.S. tactical nuclear weapons at sea, but
U.S. dual-capable aircraft and their nuclear weapons remain based in Europe; this
preserves the alliance's historic emphasis on extended deterrence. These reductions
translate to a presence of less than half the level of our forces at the beginning of the
decade. NATO itself has adapted, through a new strategic concept that proposes
smaller and multinational forces with increased mobility and an emphasis on crisis
management As U.S. forces stationed in Europe become smaller, they must
remain capable of responding to crises throughout and outside of die region.

The end of the Warsaw Pact and the emergence of democratic stares in
Eastern Europe is a development of immense strategic significance. It is critical to
U.S. interests in Europe and those of our allies that we assist the new democracies
in Eastern Europe to consolidate their democratic institutions, establish free market
economies and safeguard their national independence. Regional security challenges
work to divert their efforts from these ends and endanger their progress. The
continued ascendancy of democratic reformers in Russia, Ukraine and other stares
of Eastern Europe would be the surest counter to concerns raised by the long
history of conflict in the region.

Security and democratization in the former Eastern Bloc also would be
enhanced by mutual cooperation among the Eastern Europeans as well as with the
United States, NATO and other Western Allies. NATO can assist the Eastern
Europeans in reevaluating their defense postures. We must increase our defense-to-
defense contacts with countries of both die former Soviet Union and the countries
of Eastern Europe. These contacts should strive to underscore to the military
leaders of these new democracies the importance of civilian control of the military
through die institutions of democratic government We also must assist the Eastern

Europeans in reforming their military institutions as they institute new national
defense doctrines to replace the offensive posture associated with the Warsaw Pact

The United States has a significant stake in promoting democratic
consolidation within and peaceful relations among Russia, Ukraine, and other new
states of the former Soviet Union. A democratic partnership with Russia, Ukraine,
and the other new states would be the best possible outcome. If democracy matures
in Russia and Ukraine there is every possibility that they will be a force for peace
not only in Europe, but in other regions where previously Soviet policy aggravated
local conditions and encouraged unrest and conflict

Our increasing defense-to-defense contacts with Russia, Ukraine, and the
other new states should support the peaceful resolution of differences among them
and help in fostering democratic philosophies of civil-military relations through the
institutions of democratic government, transparency, and defensive military
doctrines and postures. We also can further our concerns and those of our allies by
assisting the efforts of Russia, Ukraine, and the other new states to reduce
dramatically the military burden on their societies, further reduce their forces,
convert excess military industries to civilian production, assist efforts to dismantle
and dispose of nuclear weapons safely and maintain firm command and control
over those that remain, and prevent leakage of advanced military technology and
expertise to other countries. Military budget cuts in Russia and the other new states
will significantly improve the chances of democratic consolidations and
demilitarization by freeing up resources for more productive investments and thus
improving the chance of economic success.

At the same time, as we work to strengthen democracy, we must consider
the possibility that undemocratic regimes could emerge in some of the new states
and seek to remilitarize their policies and societies. Our challenge and that of our
allies is to maintain our collective capacity to defend against an aggressive regime in
such a way that we do not disrupt future cooperation with a democratic state or
weaken the chances of successful reform. Overall, we strengthen the hand of
democracy if our opposition to aggression is clear and there is a common
understanding that the potential remains for strong collective response to
aggression.

East Asia/Pacific

East Asia and the Pacific hold enormous strategic and economic importance
for us and our allies. Japan and Korea together represent almost sixteen percent of
the world economy; China alone holds a quarter of the world’s population. U.S.
two-way trade with the region stands at $310 billion, approximately one third more
than die total of our two-way trade with Europe. In addition, East Asia remains an
area of enormous concentration of military power, actual and latent, nuclear and
conventional. The area contains either within it or on its periphery many of the
largest armies in the world, including those of Russia, China, India, the two
Koreas, and Vietnam.

To buttress the vital political and economic relationships we have along the
Pacific rim, we must main tarn a significant military presence in the area, which even
before current reductions in Asia represented only a small proportion of U.S. forces
woridwide. We must maintain sufficient forward deployed forces and power
projection capability to reassure our regional allies and friends, to preclude

destabilizing military rivalries, to secure freedom of the seas, to deter threats to our
key political and economic interests, and to preclude any hostile power from
attempting to dominate the region. A strong U.S. military position, welcomed by
leaders throughout the region, promotes conditions conducive to realization of
objectives we share: democratization, protection of human rights, peaceful political
change, and the spread of market economies and prosperity. Our forces in the
region also support other of our U.S. security objectives, as recendy demonstrated
by the reliance on Pacific military facilities and forces to help project power into the
Persian Gulf.

We must work to preserve our vigorous security alliances, especially with
Japan, the Republic of Korea, Australia, Thailand, and the Philippines. We should
continue to encourage Japan and South Korea in particular to assume greater
responsibility sharing, urging both to increase prudently their defensive capabilities
to deal with threats and responsibilities they face and to assume a greater share of
financial support for U.S. forward deployed forces that contribute to their security.
Japanese contributions in securing maritime approaches is one example. We also
should persist in efforts to ensure an equitable, two-way flow of technology in our
security cooperation with advanced allies such as Japan. We must plan to continue
to safeguard critical sea lines of communications linking us to our allies and trading
partners.

As our Pacific friends and allies are assuming greater responsibility for their
defense, we can restructure our forces and reduce the number of ground and
support farces forward deployed there. An appropriate framework for adjustments
to our forward-deployed forces in the region is outlined in the East Asia Strategy
Initiative as reported to Congress. In Phase I of our planned withdrawals more
than 25,000 troops were withdrawn from bases in East Asia by December 1992.
This includes the withdrawal from the Philippines. Plans to remove additional
forces from South Korea have been suspended while we address the problem posed
by the North Korean nuclear program. In time we should look to implement
Phases II and HI of the East Asia Strategy Initiative, with the objective of keeping
substantial forces forward deployed in Asia for the foreseeable future.

Despite recent positive trends toward political liberalization and market-
oriented economic reforms, die East Asia and Pacific region continues to be
burdened by several legacies of the Cold Wan the Soviet annexation of the
Northern Territories of Japan, the division of the Korean Peninsula, and the civil
war in Cambodia. The end of Communism in Europe is likely to bring pressure on
remaining Communist regimes with unknown consequences for regional stability.
We should continue to advance our relations with China on a realistic basis but also
should ensure that Taiwan has the armaments needed to defend itself as provided by
die Taiwan Relations Act, while taking into account the August 1982 Communique
with China on Taiwan arms sales. We should work to curtail proliferation of
weapons of mass destruction and to advance democracy, freedom, and human
rights in the countries of the region that lack them.

Our most active regional security concern in Asia remains the military threat
posed by North Korea to our treaty ally, the Republic of Korea. Our concerns are
mtenriffed by North Korea’s efforts to develop weapons of mass destruction and
delivery systems. Although we have begun some reductions in our forces as part
of shifting greater responsibility to our ally, we must maintain sufficient military
capabilities together with the Republic of Korea to deter aggression by the North or
to defeat it should deterrence fail Our overall objective with regard to the Korean

23

peninsula should remain to support its peaceful unification on terms acceptable to
the Korean people which foster democracy, freedom, and observance of human
rights.

The emergence of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) as
an increasingly influential regional actor has been an important positive
development ASEAN's population of 320 million is almost twice that of Japan
and Korea combined. Southeast Asia is a region of increasing economic strength.
By the end of the century, the combined ASEAN economies are forecasted to reach
$800 billion, over $100 billion larger than China’s. The United States shares an
interest with the ASEAN countries in precluding Southeast Asia from becoming an
area of strategic competition among regional powers.

With regard to U.S. bases in Southeast Asia, we have withdrawn our forces
from the Philippines, consistent with the desires of the Philippine government. At
the same time, we have sought to broaden our network of access agreements similar
to the recently concluded Singapore access memorandum in lieu of permanent bases
throughout Southeast Asia. These kinds of agreements will facilitate bilateral
training, exercises, and interoperability, thereby enhancing our ability to work with
allies and friends in crisis.

The Australia-New Zealand-United States (ANZUS) alliance relationship
remains an important component of our security architecture in the Pacific, although
security guarantees to New Zealand are presently suspended because of New
Zealand's failure to live up to its alliance obligations. Our goal should remain to
strengthen our partnership with Australia and work to remove obstacles to
reintegrating New Zealand as a full partner in ANZUS.

As is the case in other regions, proliferation remains a central concern in
Asia. Where appropriate, as on the Korean peninsula, we can explore selective
conventional arms control and confidence building measures that enhance stability.
We should pursue our cooperation with friendly regional states, including
assistance to combat insurgency, terrorism, and drug trafficking.

The MiddU East/Persian Gulf and South Asia

In die Middle East and Persian Gulf, we should seek to foster regional
stability, deter aggression against our friends and interests in the region, protect
U.S. nationals and property, and safeguard our access to international air and
seaways and to the region's important sources of oil. We should strive to
encourage a peace process that brings about reconciliation between Israel and the
Arab states as well as between Palestinians and Israel in a manner consonant with
our enduring commitment to Israel's security. Some near-term dangers are
alleviated with the defeat of Iraqi forces, but we must recognize that regional
dynamics can change and a rejuvenated Iraq or a rearmed Iran could move in this
decade to dominate die Gulf and its resources. We must remain prepared to act
decisively in the Middle East/Persian Gulf region as we did in Operations Desen
Shield and Desen Storm if our vital interests there are threatened anew. We also
must be prepared to counter the t er r o rism, insurgency, and subversion that
adversaries may use to threaten governments supportive of U.S. security interests.

The Gulf War has greatly enhanced our security relations in the Middle
East/Persian Gulf region and underscored their continued importance. Taken

together, many facets of this experience -- cooperation in combat, logistical
support, and financial participation -- and our subsequent cooperation on forward
presence of U.S. forces promise continued close ties with nations of the region on
which we can build.

To discourage the rise of a challenger hostile to our interests in the region,
we must maintain a level of forward military presence adequate to reassure our
friends and deter aggressors and present a credible crisis response capability. In
consultation with our regional friends, we should increase our presence compared
to the pre-Gulf War period. We will want to have the capability to return forces
quickly to the region should that ever be necessary. We also should strengthen our
bilateral security ties and encourage active regional collective defense.

We can strengthen stability throughout the region by sustaining and
improving the self-defense capabilities of our regional friends. The United States is
committed to the security of Israel and to maintaining the qualitative edge that is
critical to Israel's security. Israel's confidence in its security and U.S.-Israel
strategic cooperation contribute to stability, as demonstrated once again during the
Persian Gulf War. At the same time, our assistance to our Arab friends to defend
themselves against aggression also strengthens security throughout the region,
including for Israel.

We can help our friends meet their legitimate defensive needs with U.S.
foreign military and commercial sales without jeopardizing power balances in the
region. We should tailor our security assistance programs to enable our friends to
bear better the burden of defense and to facilitate standardization and interoperability
of recipient country forces with our own. We must focus these programs to enable
our regional friends to modernize their forces, upgrade their defense doctrines and
planning, and acquire essential defensive capabilities.

We should build on existing bilateral ties and negotiate needed agreements
to enhance military access and piepositioning arrangements and other types of
defense cooperation. These protocols will strengthen and broaden the individual
and collective defense of friendly states.

The infusion of new and improved conventional arms and the proliferation
of ballistic missiles and weapons of mass destruction during the past decade have
dramatically increased offensive capabilities and the potential danger from future
wars throughout die region. We should continue to work with all regional states to
reduce military expenditures for offensive weapons and reverse the proliferation of
nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons and long-range missiles. We also
should continue to work with leading suppliers of conventional weapons to the
region (as called for in President Bush’s 1991 Middle East arms control initiative)
to prevent the transfer of militarily significant technology and resources to states
which might threaten U.S. friends or upset the regional balance of power.

We should seek to maintain constructive, cooperative relations with India
and Pakistan, strive to moderate tensions between them, and endeavor to eliminate
nuclear arms programs on the subcontinent In this regard, we should work in
South Asia as elsewhere to have all countries adhere to the Non-Proliferation
Treaty and to place their nuclear energy facilities under International Atomic
Energy Agency safeguards.

The presence of drug production and trafficking and instances of
international terrorism complicate our relations with regional countries. The
Department should continue to contribute to U.S. counter-terrorism initiatives and
support the efforts of U.S. agencies in the region.

Latin America and the Caribbean

In Latin America and the Caribbean, the United States seeks to sustain the
extraordinary democratic progress of the last decade and maintain a stable security
environment As in the past the focus of U.S. security policy should remain
assisting democratic consolidation and the efforts of the democratic nations in the
region to defend themselves against the threat posed by insurgency and terrorism.

In addition, the United States must assist its neighbors in combating the instability
engendered by illicit drugs, as well as continuing efforts to prevent illegal drugs
from entering the United States.

Cuba poses an area of special concern for the United States. The end of
Warsaw Pact subsidies has added to Cuba’s economic decline. Over the near- to
mid-term, Cuba’s tenuous internal situation and its disproportionately large military
could generate new challenges to U.S. policy, particularly because Castro retains
the hostile intent that has for decades sought to undermine democratic progress in
Central and South America.

The situation in Central America will remain a concern. In El Salvador, we
should seek the continued successful implementation of the agreement reached by
the Salvadoran government and the FMLN. We also should seek peaceful
resolution of the conflict in Guatemala, in Panama, we should seek to strengthen
their democratic institutions. Our programs there must also provide die capabilities
to meet U.S. responsibilities under the Panama Canal Treaties, including defense of
the Canal after 1999.

The small island-states of the eastern Caribbean remain vulnerable to
destabilization. Assistance in economic development is key, but we also should
explore ways of strengthening the Eastern Caribbean Regional Security System to
strengthen democracy in these nations.

Following implementation of the Panama Canal treaty, we will have no
permanent bases on the Latin America mainland. The general trend toward
democratization and peace in Latin America and the dramatic reductions of former
Soviet and East European aid to Cuba are long-sought developments. Nonetheless,
potential regional problems remain, including the potential far instability in Cuba
and elsewhere, and the continuing challenge of stopping trafficking in illegal drugs
from this region.

Countering drug trafficking remains a high priority. Our counterdrug
progams in the region must focus on stemming the flow of drugs by attacking drug
trafficking at the source, in the producing and refining countries, and along the
transit routes to the United States.

Sub-Saharan Africa

Sub-Saharan Africa has made encouraging progress toward democratization
and economic liberalization. While seeking to facilitate these trends wherever
possible, our continuing military role should be to ensure the safety of U.S.
citizens, including undertaking noncombatant evacuation operations when
necessary; alleviating disaster and distress with humanitarian assistance;
strengthening the security, stability, and economic development of friendly states
and supporting their democratic development; and extending support to international
peacekeeping efforts. Our commitment to alleviating distress can be seen
particularly in our role in Operation Restore Hope in Somalia, striving to create a
secure environment for the provision of humanitarian relief operations. Out of the
turmoil in South Africa we hope to see emerge a fully representative government
still friendly to the United States and supportive of Western interests in the area.

CONCLUSION

We must preserve the extraordinary environment that has emerged from the
challenges of the Cold War — an environment within which the values of freedom
that we and our principal allies hold dear can flourish. We can secure and extend the
remarkable democratic "zone of peace" that we and our allies now enjoy, preclude
threats, and guard our national interests.

The Gulf War is a vivid reminder that we cannot be sure when or where the
next conflict will arise. In early 1990, many said there were no threats left because
of the Soviet commitment to withdraw from Eastern Europe; very few expected that
we would be at war within a year. The experience of the past century is replete
with instances in which enormous strategic changes often arose unexpectedly in the
course of a few years or even less. This is not a lesson that we should have to keep
learning anew.

As we reshape America's military and reduce its size, we must be careful
that we do so in accordance with a defense strategy and a plan that will preserve the
integrity of the military capability that we have so carefully built. If we choose
wisely today, we can do well something America has always done badly before --
we can draw down our military force at a responsible rate that will not end up
endangering our security. The new Regional Defense Strategy has set a course to
ensure our ability to deal with potential threats and shape the environment in ways
favorable to our security.